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What's more, he insisted that
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Foreign Affairs Quarterly,
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the officials of the United
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project as a desperate race

against the deadly might of fascism did the scientists reluctantly ac-
cept secrecy, first in the form of self-imposed regulations and later
as official national security policy.

Teller accepted secrecy as a wartime necessity, but only a few
months after the war was over, he was on the public record to min-
imize security regulations. He testified before the Special Commit-
tee on Atomic Energy of Congress in November 1945. By this time
the so-called Smyth Report had been published, explaining in
some detail the process of developing the bomb, and leaving only
the mechanical details of bomb construction under wraps.

"All of the security regulations are irksome," Teller told the
Congressmen. "Some seem to be unnecessary, especially since
hostilities have ended, and some rules of secrecy are a serious hin-
drance to progress."

His goal was at least partial removal of secrecy. "Purely scientific
data—that is, facts concerning natural phenomena—must not be
kept secret," Teller testified. "If such secrecy is continued it will
warp the entire research activity of any man who is involved on
work in atomic power. He either has to sever relations with the
scientific world not involved in the development of atomic power,
or he has to acquire a split personality, remembering in certain
parts of his work only certain parts of the information available to
him."

Teller insisted that "scientific facts cannot be kept secret for any
length of time. They are readily rediscovered. If we attempt to
keep scientific facts secret it will certainly hinder us, but will hardly
interfere with the work of a potential competitor."⁶

The only justifiable secrecy, in Teller's opinion, was that which
dealt with technical details. And the policing of security regula-
tions, he suggested, should be largely entrusted to the people who
themselves engage in the work.

In 1946, aware of the rapidly chilling relationship between the
United States and Russia, Teller made a proposal that, for its time,
was almost heresy. It recalled in its political simplicity an earlier
suggestion made in the prewar period by Russia's genial foreign
minister, Maxim Litvinoff. He had argued that the way to disarm is
to disarm. Such candor was viewed with suspicion. Litvinoff was
ridiculed and his plan was dismissed.

Teller's suggestion, little noticed at the time, was for an open so-
ciety with free communication jointly assured by the United States

"Life and Times of Edward Teller: Energy & Conflict"

Stanley Blumberg & Gwenn Owens

GP Putnam's Sons. New York. 1976

The Ground Floor

Hoban designed a large kitchen where cooks prepared dinners in pots, pans, and kettles suspended by cranes and hooks over wood fires. The architect's functional plans became quickly outdated. In 1850 Millard Fillmore tried to improve the kitchen by adding a modern stove, but his cook was upset by its futuristic design. The flues and draughts were beyond him. The cook appealed to Fillmore who made a trip to the Patent Office where the President personally inspected the model. He then taught the cook how to use the stove and peace was restored to the kitchen.

In the 1890s Mrs Benjamin Harrison moved the main kitchen to the northwest side of the ground floor where it has remained.

The most awkward part of Hoban's plan was that of placing the visitors' entrance one floor above the ground. If Hoban could not foresee the long lines of tourists, neither could he have seen the growth of the official receiving lines which the President's house would have to accommodate. Until 1902 the architect's design forced the official and unofficial visitors to enter by the first floor and not the ground floor. The result was "disagreeable and unsightly" according to an official of the time. Hats, coats, robes, and other impedimenta were strewn around the state parlors and formal rooms. The receiving lines of foreign and national dignitaries were interrupted and cluttered by makeshift checking facilities.

Theodore Roosevelt's restoration placed a visitors' entrance on the ground floor. A remodeled door under the South Portico permitted guests to enter an oval room called the Diplomatic Reception Room. Adjacent rooms were used for coats and hats. Three other rooms were created which later became known as the Library and the Gold and China Rooms.

The Library is little more than a setting. Since Theodore Roosevelt, Presidents have kept their books on the second floor, in the family quarters. In 1952, when the first television tour of the White House was broadcast, President Truman remarked that he had more books in his upstairs library than were in the official library on the ground floor.

The Gold and China Rooms can also be used as check rooms, but there has always been an effort to make them into minor museums. The China Room has traditionally displayed the porcelains of earlier Presidents. The Gold Room displays vermeil objects which have been valued at one million dollars.

The rest of the rooms on the floor are utilitarian. Hoban's kitchen became a storage room. When movies became more popular, it was turned into a small theater. Later, a private movie theater was placed in the East Executive Wing and the room became the control booth for radio broadcasts from the White House. It is now a general utility room which on the day of broadcast was being used as an upholstery shop.

PA77

SOUERS

WASHINGTON--REAR ADM. SIDNEY W. SOUERS IS QUITTING AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, TOP DEFENSE AGENCY. HE WILL TAKE ON NEW DUTIES AS A SPECIAL ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT TRUMAN ON SECURITY MATTERS.

THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCED THE CHANGE TODAY AND SAID IT IS INTENDED TO GIVE SOUERS, A RETIRED OFFICER, MORE TIME TO DEVOTE TO HIS PRIVATE INTERESTS.

JAMES S. LAY, JR., ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, WILL TAKE OVER SOUERS' POST ON JAN. 15.

LAY HAS BEEN WITH THE COUNCIL SINCE IT WAS SET UP UNDER THE ARMED SERVICES UNIFICATION ACT IN SEPTEMBER, 1947. IT IS COMPOSED OF THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE PRESIDENT, SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD.

SOUERS, FORMER CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, HAS HAD A BIG HAND IN PUTTING THE COUNCIL ON A FULL WORKING BASIS.

HE HAS BEEN DRAWING A \$15,000 A YEAR SALARY. ON HIS NEW JOB, HE WILL BE PAID ON A DAILY BASIS.

THE ARRANGEMENT WILL LET HIM HAVE MORE TIME TO SPEND AS CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF THE NATIONAL LINENS SERVICE CORP. OF ATLANTA. HE ALSO HAS FARMING INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST MISSOURI.

LAY IS 38 AND HAS SERVED IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE ARMY. HE IS A NATIVE OF WASHINGTON, D.C.

LT120P 12/21

King, the ONI, the director of Naval Communications, and the navy member of the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board.²⁸ Also on 17 September the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued general instructions for all Ultra recipients, ordering them "to continue to maintain the secrecy of Ultra in peace as closely as it has been maintained in war." The Combined Chiefs warned that there should be no lessening of security, because,

to disclose now or hereafter the measure of our success on techniques or procedures[,] or any of the specific results[,] would be most hazardous because (A) Ultra will be required for knowledge of the activities of the Germans and the Japanese and for controlling underground movements among them. It is essential that their suspicions be not aroused if knowledge is to continue. (B) Other threats to world security may arise in the future[,] and knowledge of what has been achieved by Ultra in this war could only serve to put our future enemies on their guard thereby rendering similar success far more difficult if not impossible.

Consequently, although "in the years to come there may be leaks and partial disclosures," the Combined Chiefs insisted that it was "most important that these be given no official confirmation or [be] reinforced by additional statements by those who were also in the know." Ultra-Magic veterans must resist "all temptation to divulge the Ultra Secret," because "the present and future best interests of our countries demand that it be maintained."²⁹

The basis for nearly fifty years of total official secrecy regarding Ultra-Magic cooperation, as well as the selective, still-continuing secrecy policies of the two countries, was thereby laid. The presidential authorization order clearly had made the British and American military authorities extremely anxious about security, because they wished to guard and protect their continuing Ultra-Magic partnership. The 12 September 1945 order may also have decided Truman on what should be done with OSS, and Donovan's expensive and controversial proposal for a large postwar central intelligence agency. On the day following his authorization of continued cryptanalytic cooperation with Britain, the president directed his budget director, Harold Smith, to

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Smith, Bradley *The Ultra-Magic Decks: The Most
Secret Special Relationships 1940-1946*
Presidio Press Novato, CA. 1993

prepare an order abolishing OSS, "even if Donovan didn't like it." A week later, the president signed the OSS dissolution order "without comment."³⁰

On 20 September 1945 Harold Smith's Budget Bureau staff finally completed its proposal for the organizational arrangement of postwar American intelligence. Amid much vague theorizing, the plan actually confirmed the traditional independent collection prerogatives of a series of federal government departments and bureaus ranging from State, through War and Navy, to the FBI. Some small concessions were made to the principle of coordination and liaison, but the budget specialists left intact most of America's failed system of fragmented intelligence collection and processing. In regard to only one aspect of postwar American intelligence collection, aside from the purchase of maps, did the Budget Bureau assert that "the case for central direction [was] particularly strong," and that was, of course, cryptanalysis.³¹

Thus, for the most hardheaded of doubting realists—the director of the Budget Bureau—cryptanalysis may well have taken on the characteristics of something close to a wonder weapon in September 1945. It had a proven track record, was inexpensive compared with the central intelligence plans of the spendthrift Donovan, and could be kept totally secret. The latter point was especially important, because a strong consensus had not yet formed in the United States for an assertive postwar foreign policy, and not even the White House seemed at this moment to have a clear idea of what the future held regarding America's relations with the rest of the world. If the staff of the Budget Bureau had been privy to either the wartime Ultra-Magic sharing agreements or the continuation authorization just approved by Truman, they most likely would have been even more enthusiastic about cryptanalysis, since the arrangements with the British offered the prospect of further lessening American intelligence costs by securing free access to Britain's worldwide radio and cable interception nets, as well as to a substantial portion of its code- and cipher-breaking capability.

Such crass budgetary considerations may seem in dubious taste when applied to as pathbreaking and significant a matter as the September 1945 Anglo-American decision to continue the cryptanalytic partnership into the postwar era. That decision created a secret special relationship that would evolve into the longest-lasting confidential partnership in the history of the world. But there are no indications in the

patchy open records now available that Bletchley, any more than the American military services, supported continuation of the wartime arrangements because of any farsighted vision of the future. Nor is there any compelling reason to conclude that an unusually broad viewpoint then dictated the perspective of Clement Attlee, any more than it did of Harry Truman. Both leaders were conscientious and hardworking, but hardly inclined to seek out distant realities beyond the horizon.

The cryptanalysts and the intelligence specialists in the two countries wanted the partnership to continue because it worked well for them, and if it were broken off each side would know too much about the cryptanalytic methods of the other to let either Whitehall or the Pentagon rest in peace. Furthermore, Britain was even more desperate to cut its costs than was Washington in September 1945. Whitehall faced a crushing burden of foreign and domestic debts, the Empire was clamoring for reform and independence, the public at home demanded an expensive welfare state, and postwar occupation and military expenses promised to impose additional burdens on the Exchequer. Britain had to seize hold of anything that could lessen its financial troubles and permit it to gain benefits from the special wartime relationship it had enjoyed with the now seemingly all-powerful United States.

Continuation of Anglo-American cryptanalytic cooperation was therefore a natural. The overarching interests of the tax men and the wishes of the intelligence and code-breaking professionals were united at a time when parsimony and worried suspicion in international affairs were the orders of the day. The situation prevailing in the immediate postwar world cried out for an arrangement that might assist in the West's pursuit of stability. The world was devastated, with international trade reduced to a crawl, and only three great powers left in existence, of which Britain was both the weakest and the one most heavily burdened with global economic, political, and military obligations. The peoples of the world were reeling under the shock of the war's savagery and destructiveness, topped off by the atomic bomb.

Order and security stood near the head of nearly everyone's want list in the West during the autumn of 1945. However, the bumps and irritations that had occurred between the USSR and the western powers during the final year of the war—ranging from Operation Sunrise to harsh Soviet occupation policies and the disputes over Poland—were not reassuring. Those tensions and troubles had been cast into an even

Army and Navy and the British Government Code and Cipher School collaborated closely in regard to cryptanalytic techniques and procedures[,] and exchanged in full the intelligence derived from cryptanalysis." The latter portion of this statement, especially as it was applicable to the sharing of naval cryptanalysis, overstated the degree of cooperation, but the Three Secretaries were certainly correct when they went on to declare that "the results of this collaboration were very profitable."

After two lines enumerating specific benefits gained by the Ultra-Magic partnership—lines that have been blacked out by NSA—the Three Secretaries went on to declare that "in view of the disturbed conditions of the world and the necessity of keeping informed of the technical developments and possible hostile intentions of foreign nations [here again, NSA blacked out a line, which, if it did not include a reference to the USSR, and perhaps the atomic bomb, would be quite surprising], it is recommended that you authorize continuation of collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom in the field of communication intelligence."²⁷

The president thereupon signed a one-sentence top secret memorandum on 12 September 1945, which read:

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are hereby authorized to direct the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, to continue collaboration in the field of communication intelligence between the United States Army and Navy and the British, and to extend, modify or discontinue this collaboration, as determined in the best interests of the United States.

The president signed only one copy of the memorandum, and that copy was given to the secretary of state, perhaps because he could act as an honest broker in any dispute between the army and the navy over the terms and qualifications of the continuation authorization. Additional, unsigned, copies of the order were provided to the War and Navy departments, and the president also retained one copy in the White House Naval Aide's files. By 17 September the U.S. Navy's copy of the presidential order had already made the rounds through the offices of Admiral

King, the ONI, the director of Naval Communications, and the navy member of the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board.²⁸ Also on 17 September the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued general instructions for all Ultra recipients, ordering them "to continue to maintain the secrecy of Ultra in peace as closely as it has been maintained in war." The Combined Chiefs warned that there should be no lessening of security, because,

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Short Press Conference Monday July 21, 52.

No Sunday conference.

Truman had been sick Walter Reed
- spend weekend "catching up on things" in the house

Security
Folder
File of
Joseph
Short Bx

Truman Secrets

"newspapers & slick magazines" for what he
said were disclosures of 95% of the government
secrets - from Yale study from CIA
- security info aside of Sept 24, 51
- not for any other reason (Short) than to protect "the
nats secrets of the United States"

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General Cutler - Deputy Director of PSB 12 Nov 1951